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FALLOUT OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS FOR HAMAS 
AS A NON-STATE ARMED ACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Arab uprisings, which started in 2011 and have shaken the regional status quo 
are now late 2013 countered by the very forces they were trying to remove. The de-
velopments, which have taken place in the last three years significantly influenced 
positioning of all the state and non-state actors in the Middle East. Much attention 
has been given to changing fortunes of the fallen or the still ruling regimes in the 
region, however less to armed non-state actors, such as Hamas. The present article 
attempts to fill this gap by outlining the position of Hamas before the Arab upri-
sings and examining how they influenced its standing. The two uprisings, which 
directly and most significantly affected Hamas were the uprising of Egyptian pe-
ople and the uprising of Syrian people. The transfiguring situation has not only put 
the organisation in motion, but also spotlighted its internal divisions. The future 
that lies ahead is not clear, as Hamas finds itself in a complex regional environment 
with a number of opportunities and even more challenges to be faced.
Hamas before the Arab uprisings
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyah), Ha-
mas, has been developing and redeveloping its structure and political aims since its 
establishment in December 1987, 
X:
 20
13
 n
r 3
168 MAGDA QANDIL
at the very beginning of the Palestinian uprising (intifāḍah), as the organizational expres-
sion of Muslim Brotherhood participation in the anti-Israeli resistance after two decades of Islamic 
political quietism.1
Hamas was never part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – cre-
ated in 1964 and recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people by majority of states, nor its legislative body the Palestinian National Co-
uncil (PNC). It was rather engaged in competition and later in open hostilities with 
the PLO, especially its main and most powerful wing – Fatah.2 
Learning from the experience of its main Palestinian rival, Hamas has al-
ways been very careful not to ruin its relations with powerful regional sponsors. 
The 1990 Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait had Yaser Arafat, the leader of 
Fatah and the PLO, throwing in his lot with Iraq and isolating the Gulf countries. 
Thus, Hamas was presented with a real dilemma: 
The Gulf sheikhdoms had provided major funding over the years, but Palestinian grass-
-roots sentiment was deeply hostile to the perceived corruption and wasteful opulence of the ‘oil 
sheikhs’. Hamas sought safety by calling […] for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf, 
evacuation of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and freedom for the Kuwaitis to choose their own future. 
Hamas was rewarded with continued financial assistance, unlike the PLO, which suffered a total 
cut off.3
Receiving of ‘oil money’ had to be balanced with the movement’s rhetoric: 
hitherto vowing upon Arab Muslims to join its struggle against Israel, but also to 
turn against their rulers, especially secular Arab dictators, who – according to Ha-
mas – had no respect of Muslim values, served the Western and Israeli interests, as 
well as abandoned the Palestinian people, which was all not very far from what the 
Gulf monarchies engaged themselves in. 
For a number of years, in the 1990s, Hamas had offices, its political bureau, 
in Jordan. However, in 1999 the organization was banned by the Jordanian authori-
ties reportedly under the United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority pressu-
re. It soon resettled its offices to Damascus. Syrian regime and Hamas had shared 
an animosity towards PLO headed by Yaser Arafat, especially since his signing of 
the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993 – strongly rejected by both. With time Hamas 
became an important element of the so called resistance axis of Iran, Syria, and 
Hezbollah, enjoying their support and funding. 
In 2006 Hamas won elections in the occupied Palestinian territories. Its vic-
tory was not accepted neither by the rival Fatah, which for the first time in history 
was not granted power by the Palestinian people, nor by Israel and the Western 
1 J.-F. Legarin, “Hamas”, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Vol. 2, ed. 
J. Esposito, Oxford 1995, p. 94.
2 For the details of the Hamas-PLO/Fatah relation see: Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the 
Search for State. The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993, Oxford 2004, pp. 650–653.
3 Ibidem, p. 651.
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powers. A year later Fatah with Israeli and American backing launched fratricidal 
fight against Hamas. In result, the Islamic movement lost the control over the West 
Bank to Fatah, but managed to keep the Gaza Strip. Its new role of the government 
in Gaza was further complicated by its military activity against Israel, as well as 
Israel’s attacks on the territory, especially December 2008 – January 2009 Israel’s 
war on Gaza. Notably, it was not only Israel, but also Egypt tightening its grip on 
the Gaza Strip by gradually closing and isolating it.
In this circumstances the organisation’s base in Damascus proved to be of vi-
tal importance. Eventually, Hamas has had four main branches: (1) Hamas in Gaza 
led by Ismail Haniyeh, (2) Hamas in the West Bank, (3) Hamas in Israeli prisons, 
(4) Hamas in exile led by Khaled Meshal with Musa Abu Marzouq as his deputy. 
On the strategic regional and international level decisions have been taken by the 
Hamas in exile branch, however position of the leadership in Gaza has been of 
importance. The other two branches – the West Bank branch and the prison branch 
– suppressed and weakened by both the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis have 
not had that much say.4 5 
Nonetheless, at end of 2010 the movement found itself in stalemate. 
In the stagnant years preceding [Arab uprisings], [Hamas] had been at an impasse: isola-
ted diplomatically; caged in economically by Egypt and Israel; crushed by Israeli and Palestinian 
Authority security forces in the West Bank; warily managing an unstable ceasefire with a far more 
powerful adversary; incapable of fulfilling popular demands for reconciliation with Fatah; and 
more or less treading water in Gaza, where some supporters saw it as having sullied itself with the 
contradictions of being an Islamist movement constricted by secular governance and a resistance 
movement actively opposing Gaza-based attacks against Israel.6
 It has all changed from the very onset of the following year.
Fallout of the Arab uprisings for Hamas
The 2011 uprising in Syria turned out to be a serious game changer and made 
Hamas eventually leave the country losing both its base and its main sponsor – 
Iran. The fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and electoral victory of Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood in 2012 significantly improved the situation and opened a lot of new 
doors for Hamas, both its Gaza and the exiled branch. It was the case, however, 
only until July 2013, when president Mohamed Morsi, hailing from the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was removed from power. Cairo could no longer serve as a new re-
gional base of Hamas, as was Damascus for over a decade, nor Gaza could enjoy 
its opening to the world via Egypt any more. 
4 Z. Chehab, Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies, London 2007. 
5 K. Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, London 2006.
6 Light at the End of their Tunnels? Hamas and the Arab Uprisings”. International Crisis 
Group, “Middle East Report” 2012, No. 129, p. i.
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Hamas has been searching again for a safe seat in the region and a sponsor 
as generous and flexible as Iran used to be. First, the Syrian uprising and its reper-
cussions for Hamas will be examined, then, the effects of the Egyptian uprising and 
its reversal for the Islamic movement will be reviewed.
Uprising in Syria and the loss of a patron
Hamas’ alliance with the Syrian regime was in its big part owing to the traditional 
Damascus opposition to Yaser Arafat and the PLO – dating back to the early 1970s. 
Syria on the one hand hosted a big share of Palestinian refugees (over half a million 
people today), on the other the country’s previous long-term ruler Hafez al-Asad 
systematically used the Palestinian resistance as a political tool and ensured that 
no independent Palestinian power centre emerged in the region, since it could have 
challenged his hegemonic position. He instigated divisions and created its own Pa-
lestinian proxies (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Com-
mand, Fatah al-Intifada, Sa’iqa), as well as backed assaults on Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon during the country’s civil war.7 His ambition of being the regio-
nal preeminent figure was not to be reconciled with the PLO’s strive for indepen-
dence of Palestinian decision-making from external influence (al-qarar al-philastini 
al-mustaqil).8 This policy was only strengthened after Yaser Arafat signed on behalf 
of PLO the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993. 
In response Damascus formed the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) 
comprising of democratic, nationalist and Islamist Palestinian factions, with Ha-
mas among the last-mentioned.9 Its primary purpose was to derail the Oslo-based 
peace process and to let the Syrian regime feel in control of the Palestinian issues. 
Although, activities of the Alliance were limited to coordination of rhetoric, it was 
the reason behind Hamas’ early presence in Damascus until its official transfer to 
the Syrian capital at the end of the 1990s. Hosting of the Islamic movement, the 
7 M. Qandil, The Syrian Revolution and the Palestinian Refugees in Syria: Realities and 
risks, Palestinian Refugees in the Arab World – Reality and Prospects, AlJazeera Center for Stud-
ies, Doha 2012, p. 2–3.
8 R. Khalidi, The Assad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance, “Arab Studies Quarterly” 
1984, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 259–267.
9 The democratic factions in the Alliance view the Palestinian struggle as a part of the inter-
national socialist struggle against imperialism and capitalism. They include: the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFPL), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Pal-
estinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP). The nationalist factions in the Alliance emphasize 
the singularity of the Palestinian problem. They include: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), the Palestinian Popular 
Struggle Front (PPSF), Fatah al-Intifada, Sa'iqa. The Islamist factions in the Alliance pursue Islamic 
solutions to the Palestinian problem. They include: the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine (Is-
lamic Jihad), the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). A. Strindberg, The Damascus-Based Alli-
ance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer, “Journal of Palestine Studies” 2000, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 63–74.
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Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood, membership in which is punishable by 
death in Syria, allowed the Syrian regime to gain some credibility with major parts 
of its own society and the region. Simultaneously, 
the ‘de-Palestinization’ of the Palestinian issue in the 2000s, directly associated with the 
progressive fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement and the failures of the peace pro-
cess, allowed regional states like Syria and Iran to claim ‘guardianship’ of the Palestinian cause.10
In recent years, Palestinian factions’ presence in Syria has been based on 
the condition of their loyalty and de facto dependence from the Syrian regime. 
Nonetheless, Hamas thanks to its own direct relation with Iran, and – contrary to 
other Damascus-based factions – its presence and popular support in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, enjoyed a fair degree of independence from the Syrian regime. 
In early 2011 Hamas had reportedly warned the regime of possibility of Sy-
rians taking to the streets and advised it to introduce reforms. Later in the year, 
when protest were going on, a number of regional figures were to suggest that 
Hamas negotiates between the Syrian regime and mainly Sunni opposition, howe-
ver this was rejected by the regime.11 The Syrian uprising put the Damascus-based 
Palestinian factions in an extremely difficult position, with Palestinians in Syria 
feeling for the Syrian uprising and the regime requesting their public support. Ha-
mas, as it was striving to remain – in its own words – neutral, that means silent, 
was asked to issue a statement against sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a Sunni cleric close 
to the Muslim Brotherhood who openly criticises the regime in Damascus. Hamas 
refused, only to find itself under intensified regime pressure: some of its offices 
were closed and property confiscated. Hamas insisted that it cannot take any posi-
tion on the Syrian affairs. “It is the movement’s policy not to [officially] oppose any 
government, neither to interfere in its affairs”, as claimed by Yasser Azzam, Head 
of Refugee Affairs Bureau of Hamas in Beirut12.
However, with all the branches of Muslim Brotherhood and regional Sunni 
power-houses (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey) supporting a popular anti-regime strug-
gle, and the Shia alliance (Iran, with Hezbollah) supporting the brutal regime Hamas 
could not have remained where it was without taking any position. Neutrality was 
no longer an option.
The movement had to weigh, on the one hand, its gratitude to a regime that had supported 
it strongly when nearly all other Arab countries had shunned it, and, on the other, its connection 
to fellow Sunni Muslims who were victims of violence perpetuated by predominantly Alawite 
security forces and other supporters of President Bashar al-Asad’s regime. Likewise, it had to take 
into account ties to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, membership in which the regime had made 
punishable by death; obligations to Syria’s hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, who 
10 E. Mohns, A. Bank, Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?, “Middle East 
Policy” 2012, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 28.
11 Light at the End of their Tunnels…, p. 5–7.
12 M. Qandil, The Syrian Revolution and the Palestinian Refugees in Syria…, p. 6.
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could pay with their homes and lives for the decisions made by some of their political leaders; and 
indebtedness to the Syrian people, who had stood with the movement and even offered some $20 
million in aid to Gaza during the 2008–2009 war.13
In late 2011 and early 2012 upper and middle ranks of Hamas leadership left 
Syria quietly. The organisation remained silent about its departure and its position 
on the Syrian uprising until late 2012, when Khaled Meshal addressed it at a press 
conference in Cairo.14 Meshal announced that the Islamic movement is grateful to 
both Syria and Iran for the years of their support, and it did not wish to turn its back 
on them, however it disagrees with the approach adopted by Iran to the popular 
uprising in Syria and the Syrian government’s resorting to the security-military 
option.15 As explained by Yasser Azzam, “any [further than this] position taken by 
Hamas would harm the Palestinians in Syria. Thus, the movement’s [discretion] is 
the best protection for them.”16 Nonetheless, the Syrian regime was not prevented 
from attacking the refugee camps and putting their population under sever siege, nor 
from killing dozens if not hundreds of Palestinians of Syria, as much as it did not 
hesitate to kill hundreds of thousands of Syrians.17
The effort of Khaled Meshal not to burn all its bridges by leaving Syria did 
not really succeed, especially that he moved, at least temporarily, to Qatar. In April 
this year, after Meshal’s re-election as head of Hamas’s politburo, Al-Thawra Da-
ily, Syrian regime-controlled newspaper, commented: 
Today, as Meshal becomes the head of Hamas for the fifth time... the West Bank, Gaza and 
the whole of occupied Palestine have no reason to celebrate (...) [Meshal] cannot believe his luck. 
After an acclaimed history of struggle, he has returned to the safe Qatari embrace, wealthy and 
fattened in the age of the Arab Spring’s storms.
It concluded that Hamas has shifted “the gun from the shoulder of resistance 
[against Israel] to the shoulder of compromise”, as referred by the Lebanese The 
Daily Star newspaper quoting after AFP.18 
13 Light at the End of their Tunnels..., p. 5.
14 The exception was the 24th February 2012 speech of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas prime minster 
in Gaza, at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, in which he had thrown his support behind the Syrian 
people. It was later claimed by Hamas senior officials that this move was not agreed with the head of 
of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshal and was rather the prime minister's own initiative.
15 I. Al-Amin, Gaza: What strategy for the resistance?, “Al-Akhbar English”, 20 November 
2012, www.english.al-akhbar.com/node/14010 [30.09.2013].
16 M. Qandil, The Syrian Revolution and the Palestinian Refugees in Syria..., p. 7.
17 P. Wood, Syria must allow aid convoys to starving civilians, says US, BBC, 19 October 
2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24590085.
18 Syria slams Hamas head Meshal after re-election, “The Daily Star”, 3 April 2013, www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Apr-03/212437-syria-slams-hamas-head-meshaal-after-
re-election.ashx7 [30.09.2013].
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The divorce from the regime in Damascus meant not only loss of a base – 
vital for Hamas regional and international functioning, but even more importantly 
loss of Iran’s financial backing – essential for upholding Hamas’ economic capacity 
to rule over the Gaza Strip, as much as training and weapons supplies.19 
Uprising in Egypt and reversal of fortunes
Before the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the long-time dictator Hosni Mubarak and its se-
curity apparatus had always favoured the secular Fatah over Hamas with its strong 
links to Egypt’s own suppressed Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, in that period, Hamas 
was almost completely stranded in the 365 square kilometres of the Gaza Strip. The 
2006 electoral victory and the new role of the government responsible for 1,7 mil-
lion inhabitants of the tiny piece of land was not easy to reconcile with the militant 
rhetoric and the terrorist suicide bombing recent past. The challenge was not only 
how to feed Gaza, but also how to deal with more radical armed movements laun-
ching rockets on Israel – activity Hamas was not so long ago all involved in. Hamas 
must have appreciated that being a resistance movement is most probably easier to 
manage than being the government. The dreadful reality of Gaza could have always 
been blamed on Israel and the collaborating Arab regimes, Egypt especially, but it 
could not be excluded that people of Gaza turn their anger over their gruesome fate 
on Hamas as the ruling power.
With the fall of Mubarak in 2011 and Muslim Brotherhood winning the par-
liamentary (Freedom and Justice Party) and presidential (Mohamed Morsi) elec-
tions in 2012, the whole new era for Hamas and for the people of the Gaza Strip 
has started. As Muslim Brotherhood was gaining more influence, Hamas situation 
was improving. Nonetheless much of the security apparatus in Egypt was still in 
the hands of people connected with the old regime, thus the fallout of their struggle 
with the Brotherhood was to shape Hamas fortunes. 
As early as in June 2011 Egypt had agreed to allow 550 people a day to leave 
Gaza and to lengthen the operating hours of the Rafah border crossing between 
Gaza and Egypt. The progress was slow but meaningful. The change in Hamas si-
tuation, at least its Gaza branch, was best portrayed by juxtaposition of two pictures 
of Gaza prime minister Ismail Haniyeh: one taken in December 2006, another – in 
February 2012. 
In [the former], taken after the Egyptian government denied him entry to Gaza, Haniyeh 
crouches alone at night on the curb outside the Rafah crossing, hugging himself to keep warm in 
the winter air; in [the later], he smiles broadly as members of the crowd at Al-Azhar grasp and carry 
him aloft.20
19 E. Mohns, A. Bank, Syrian Revolt Fallout..., p. 32.
20 Light at the End of their Tunnels..., p. 4.
174 MAGDA QANDIL
The two photos are believed to portray Hamas situation before and after 
the Arab uprisings. Haniyeh’s 2012 visit at Al-Azhar was part of his – first since 
2007 – regional tour that included stops in Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Tunisia, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. In many of these countries 
he was received not as a Hamas leader but as a prime minister – to the irritation of 
Fatah officials in Ramallah. Other Gaza officials and parliamentarians alike were 
allowed to leave the Strip in order to pay official visits for the first time in several 
years since the siege. A number of high level delegations visited Gaza – including 
Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in October 2012. The crowning 
moment came in December 2012, when Khaled Meshal was allowed for the first 
time in his life to enter Gaza for the celebration of Hamas 25th anniversary. With 
him came official delegations from Indonesia, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, 
Jordan, and Egypt. Hamas was not diplomatically isolated any longer.21 
The head of the movement Khaled Meshal after his final departure from Da-
mascus in January 2012 kept shuttling between the capitals of Qatar and Egypt in 
a clear sign where Hamas’ new allegiances lie. His deputy Musa Abu Marzouq, who 
also used to be based in Damascus, opened an office in Cairo. Hamas representati-
ves were received by the Egyptian government officials and the president himself.22
For most of the 2012, the relation between Hamas and the Muslim Bro-
therhood in Egypt was at least correct and at best cordial, although it was not as 
fruitful as Hamas might have wished for. The Brotherhood stance vis-à-vis Israel 
was being internally debated. The popular sentiment among regular party members 
and even parliamentarians was openly anti-Israeli: in March 2012, the Egyptian 
People’s Assembly, in which the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won 
a major share of seats, unanimously voted to freeze all sales of Egyptian gas to Isra-
el, expel the Israeli ambassador and embark on reversal of Egypt’s policy vis-à-vis 
Israel.23 The leadership, however, had to take more conciliatory and cooperative 
approach towards Israel were they to stay in power and in good relations with 
Egypt’s main financial backer – the United States. They confirmed that as members 
of the governing party they will honour Egypt’s 1979 Peace Accord with Israel. 
Further, the Brotherhood leadership continued the Mubarak regime’s initiative of 
brokering the reconciliation talks between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah ruling over 
the West Bank. With this goal in view, they were trying to position themselves in an 
equal distance from both Palestinian parties. “Any movement on the side of the Mu-
slim Brotherhood when it is in the opposition is one thing and then when it comes 
to power it is something completely different”, explained at the time Reda Fahmy, 
a Brotherhood leader who oversees its Palestinian relations in an interview for The 
21 Ibidem.
22 O. Shaaban, Hamas and Morsi: Not So Easy Between Brothers, Carnegie Middle East 
Center, 1 October 2012. www.carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=49525 [30 September 2013].
23 Light at the End of their Tunnels..., p. 3–4.
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New York Times.24 Nonetheless, the Islamist Egyptian government’s neutrality be-
tween Hamas and Fatah was a shift from Mubarak’s policy of exclusive support 
for the Western-backed Fatah movement and its willingness to participate in peace 
talks with Israel. 
On the top of its relations with the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian 
Authority, the Brotherhood had to take into account the internal pressures from its 
opponents, who accused Hamas of being a secret armed force of the Islamist presi-
dent allegedly used by him to quell any dissent. In the media Hamas was being bla-
med for the volatile situation in the Sinai Peninsula and all the jihadi activity there, 
including the killing of 16 Egyptian soldiers in August 2012 and following events.25
It was clear at that point that Hamas had made a mistake: 
in the post-Mubarak era, it failed to properly exploit its room to manoeuvre in the Egyptian 
provinces. That is, it did not take the trouble to communicate effectively with the other elements of 
the Egyptian revolution – the secularists, the leftists, and the nationalists. This caused its stock to 
fall somewhat in the Egyptian street, even among those supporting a military posture toward Israel. 
Without intending to do so, it appeared that Hamas had injected itself into an internal Egyptian 
political dispute.26 
The new government wary of accusations against Hamas took even greater 
distance from it, as its own position was endangered.
The situation has changed dramatically with the 3rd July 2013 military-bac-
ked coup d’état, which removed Mohamed Morsi from power and opened the way 
for a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Since then, Hamas has been regu-
larly accused in the Egyptian state media of having its fighters among the Jihadists 
operating in the Sinai Peninsula, training the Jihadists, as well as providing them 
with safe haven and letting them enter Sinai through the tunnels connecting it with 
Gaza.27 Hamas repeatedly denied the accusations. Nonetheless, the Egyptian secu-
rity forces have not only stepped up their crackdown on extremists operating in the 
Sinai Peninsula, but also closed the Rafah crossing and launched themselves on 
closing or destroying of the underground tunnels. 
24 D. D. Kirkpatrick, Islamist Victors in Egypt Seeking Shift by Hamas, “The New York 
Times”, 24 March 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/world/middleeast/egypts-election-victors-
seek-shift-by-hamas-to-press-israel.html [30.09.2013].
25 16 Egyptian soldiers killed at Israel border, “Ahram Online”, 5 August 2012, www.english.
ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/49660/Egypt/Politics-/UPDATE---Egyptian-soldiers-killed-at-the-
Israel-bo.aspx [30.09.2013]; D. D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Reports Gains Against Militants in Sinai, “The 
New York Times”, 15 September 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/world/middleeast/egypts-mil-
itary-claims-gains-against-militants-in-sinai.html [30.09.2013].
26 A. Abu Amer, Hamas Changing Role in Egypt, “Al-Monitor”, 5 April 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/hamas-egypt-gaza-relations-change.html [30.09.2013].
27 For further reading on the issue of tunnels and their transformation from a clandestine, 
makeshift operation into a major commercial enterprise benefiting Hamas see: N. Pelham, Gaza’s 
Tunnel Phenomenon: The Unintended Dynamics of Israel’s Siege, “Journal of Palestine Studies” 
2012, Vol. XLI, No. 4.
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With Egypt’s military crackdown, Mr Morsi in detention and the Brotherhood leadership 
either locked up, dead or in hiding, smuggling between Gaza and Egypt has come to a virtual halt. 
That means no access to building materials, fuel that costs less than half as much as that imported 
from Israel, and many other cheap commodities Gazans had come to rely on.28
 The Hamas-ruled territory is reportedly facing a $250 million shortfall, whi-
le deprived of significant tax revenue Hamas government does not have neither old 
nor new patrons behind its back.29 Its most crucial long-time sponsor Iran has now 
started channelling funds to Islamic Jihad, an extremist militant group, which did 
not broke its ties with Damascus.30 
Internal divisions during the Arab uprisings
The Arab uprisings not only changed the regional environment, in which Hamas 
operates, but also brought to the spotlight preexisting internal differences within 
the movement. The main point of contention between the exiled and the Gaza-ba-
sed leaderships during that period was national reconciliation and a host of issues 
related to it. 
The contest within Hamas has played out most vividly and publicly over the issue of Pale-
stinian reconciliation, which touches on many of the most important strategic questions faced by 
the movement, including coexistence with Israel, conditions for accepting a state on the pre-1967 
borders, nonviolence, integration within the PLO, the functions of the Palestinian Authority, the 
status of security forces in the West Bank and Gaza and the formation of a joint national strategy 
with Fatah.31
As the Arab uprisings made the Middle Eastern actors listen carefully to po-
pular demands or be removed from power, both Hamas and Fatah understood that 
they have no other choice but to sit together and finish with the internal divisions 
and fratricidal fight, because this is what the Palestinian people – both in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip – expect them to do. A number of Fatah-Hamas meetings took 
place, reconciliation agreements were signed: agreement in Cairo in May 2011 
and agreement between Abbas and Meshal in Doha in February 2012.32 At both 
28 J. Rudoren, Pressures Rises on Hamas as Patrons Support Fades, “The New York Times”, 
23 August 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/middleeast/pressure-mounts-on-hamas-as-
economic-lifelines-are-severed.html?pagewanted=all [30.09.2013].
29 Ibidem.
30 F. Akram, In Gaza, Iran Finds an Ally More Agreeable Than Hamas, “The New York 
Times”, 31 July 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/world/middleeast/in-gaza-iran-finds-a-clos-
er-ally-than-hamas.html [30.09.2013].
31 Light at the End of their Tunnels…, p. 18.
32 The terms of Doha reconciliation meeting included: reconstruction of Gaza with $1 bil-
lion contribution from Qatar, reform of the PLO's legislative body, legislative and presidential elec-
tions, formation of a Abbas-led government of technocrats.
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occasions Khaled Meshal made declarations, which have not been consulted with 
the rest of Hamas leadership. Its members, both in the West Bank and Gaza, not 
only disagreed with Meshal, but did not hide it from the public. One of them, in 
an interview with International Crisis Group, commented on Meshal’s increasing 
unilateralism: 
Hamas does everything by SMS now. Someone recently joked that we used to be ‘HMS’ 
[the root of “Hamas” in Arabic] but have now become ‘SMS’. We used to sit and discuss, but now 
Meshal sends an SMS to inform us of a decision, and we send back an SMS with our reservations. 
There’s a lot less listening to one another.33 
The main line of division runs between the leadership constrained in the Gaza 
Strip and observing the region from that perspective and the leadership in exile not 
constrained by any location but finding it more and more difficult to settle in one. 
Gaza leadership hopeful by seeing fellow Muslim Brothers winning elections all 
over the region did not want to give up easily to Fatah-Israel-US demands, while 
the exiled leadership was ready to greater concessions towards the rival Palestinian 
faction and its backers. It was the latter that have more say. Nonetheless, the recon-
ciliation has not taken any shape so far, while the popular demand remains unmet as 
the region is entering post-uprisings era. 
Where to after the Arab uprisings?
The Arab uprisings turned the tables for Hamas a number of times testing the move-
ment’s ability to react and adapt. It proved itself as being flexibility and able to take 
risks in order to progress, i.e. by breaking the allegiance to Syria and Iran. However, 
it may be also argued that the decision to lose a base (Syria) and a patron (Iran) 
was rather a must than a choice. In January 2012, when Khaled Meshal was leaving 
Damascus, the region seemed to be on a Sunni tide with Islamists winning elections 
in a number of a countries that had just gone through popular uprisings and Sunni 
power-houses supporting the insurgents. In circumstances of sectarian polarisation 
and divisions brought to the forefront especially by the situation in Syria, an Islamist 
movement, like Hamas, must have been under enormous pressure to join the Sunni 
camp (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) by dissociating itself from the 
Shia alliance (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah), where it was an odd element according to 
sectarian logic.34 It appeared, at that point, that Hamas departure from ʽthe axis of 
resistance’ is to be compensated by new alliances in the Sunni block, in particular 
with Egypt and Qatar. 
These predictions proved to be unattainable, when significant changes took 
place in both countries in late June and early July this year: the Emir of Qatar han-
33 Light at the End of their Tunnels…, p. 23.
34 B. F. Salloukh, The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East, “The Interna-
tional Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs” 2013, No. 48, p. 32–46.
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ded power to his son, who seems to have less sympathy for Islamic movements 
than his father had; the Islamist president in Egypt was removed from power by 
military coup d’état. The region is not any more on a Sunni tide, especially with 
the uprising in Syria turning into a Sunni-Shia civil war and losing its popular mo-
mentum. The new constellation of power, still in the making, has made Hamas an 
orphan, as some analysts put it. The organisation, which during the Arab uprisings 
seemed to be destined to flourish after the years of stagnation and closure, is now on 
the road and in search of a new external base. From its point of view it is necessary 
that it finds one, as being a non-state actor without a strong patron makes it, even 
if more independent, much more vulnerable. The challenge is huge, as the possible 
options are closing down: Qatar might not be a feasible choice, while Egypt in its 
current predicament is clearly an impossible choice. There are some suggestion in 
the media that Hamas might have no better option than Sudan.35 
Wherever the organisation’s external leadership will head, it may not be po-
ssible for it anymore to make decisions without taking into account the Gaza le-
adership already unhappy with the current modalities of decision-making. It will 
also have a weight for the undergoing struggle between Sunni power-houses and 
Iran – both sides might be inclined to pull Hamas to its side. Least but not last, the 
organisation’s positioning itself on the regional scene will not be without a meaning 
for the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the fortunes of the American-sponsored pe-
ace process.
Hamas a rewolty w krajach arabskich 2011–2013
Rewolty, które wybuchły w 2011 r. i wstrząsnęły regionalnym status quo, obecnie są 
w fazie odwrotu z powodu naporu tych samych sił, które próbowały obalić. Wydarzenia na Bliskim 
Wschodzie z ostatnich trzech lat mają znaczący wpływ na położenie wszystkich państwowych 
i pozapaństwowych aktorów w regionie. W artykule uwaga została poświęcona zmiennym losom 
reżimów – tak upadłych, jak i tych wciąż rządzących, znacznie mniej pozapaństwowym aktorom 
politycznym, takim jak Hamas. Tekst jest próbą uzupełniania tego braku poprzez ukazanie Hamasu 
przed wybuchem rewolt w krajach arabskich oraz analizę ich wpływu na jego położenie. Dwie 
rewolty, które w najbardziej bezpośredni i znaczący sposób wpłynęły na sytuację ugrupowania, 
to powstania w Egipcie i Syrii. Przeobrażający się polityczny układ sił na Bliskim Wschodzie nie 
tylko wprawił Hamas w ruch, ale też uwydatnił jego wewnętrzne podziały. Organizacja znajduje się 
obecnie w skomplikowanej sytuacji – pełnej zarówno możliwości, jak i wyzwań – dlatego nawet jej 
najbliższa przyszłość pozostaje niejasna. 
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